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Abstract—Text-based analysis methods allow to reveal privacy
relevant author attributes such as gender, age and identify
of the text’s author. Such methods can compromise the pri-
vacy of an anonymous author even when the author tries to
remove privacy sensitive content. In this paper, we propose
an automatic method, called Adversarial Author Attribute
Anonymity Neural Translation (A4NT), to combat such text-
based adversaries. We combine sequence-to-sequence language
models used in machine translation and generative adversar-
ial networks to obfuscate author attributes. Unlike machine
translation techniques which need paired data, our method
can be trained on unpaired corpora of text containing different
authors. Importantly, we propose and evaluate techniques to
impose constraints on our A4NT to preserve the semantics of
the input text. A4NT learns to make minimal changes to the
input text to successfully fool author attribute classifiers, while
aiming to maintain the meaning of the input. We show through
experiments on two different datasets and three settings that
our proposed method is effective in fooling the author attribute
classifiers and thereby improving the anonymity of authors.
1. Introduction
Anonymity and privacy have been at the forefront of our
discourse about the internet since the early days [1]. Ability
to communicate anonymously helps people exercise their
freedom of speech without fear of prosecution as well as
organize social movements [2]. Anonymity could be vital
when voicing a dissenting political opinion, or attempting
to avoid harassment and discrimination. The latter two
applications require stronger anonymity in the sense that it is
not just the leak of the author’s identity which compromises
the author but even the unmasking of attributes like age, race
or gender. Exposing these private attributes can expose people
to harassment and discrimination [3, 4]. While protecting
anonymity is not the solution to the root of discrimination
and harassment, it can help avoid or reduce their occurrence.
Natural language processing (NLP) methods including
stylometric tools allow to identify the authors of anonymous
texts [5]–[7]. These methods can be used to break the
anonymity of the author even when sufficient care has been
taken to hide the identity in the content of the text. As
discussed in [8] stylometric methods can successfully identify
the authors who were protected with pseudonymity, with
just 6,500 words written by the author. Since these methods
rely solely on the content of the text and not the medium
of communication, security measures like masking the IP
addresses or posting patterns can still be vulnerable to attacks
with NLP methods. NLP-tools have also been applied to
determine authors’ private attributes like age and gender [9].
These attribute classifiers perform better than classifiers to
predict exact identity, since they deal with a smaller number
of classes. Using such attribute classifiers, an adversary can
easily obtain two out of three attributes (age and gender)
listed in [10] required for exact identification. Combined
with the fact that these methods have been shown to work
on large scale datasets [11], they pose a serious privacy risk.
Prior works to obfuscate authorship and defend against
NLP-methods has been largely restricted to semi-automatic
solutions suggesting possible changes to the user [12] or
hand-crafted transformations to text [13] which need re-
engineering on different datasets [13]. This however limits the
applicability of these defensive measures beyond the specific
dataset it was designed on. To the best of our knowledge,
generic text rephrasing using machine translation tools [14]
is the only prior work offering a fully automatic solution to
author obfuscation which can be applied across datasets. But
as we show in our experiments, machine translation based
obfuscation fails to sufficiently hide the identity and protect
against attribute classifiers.
Our work. We propose an automatic model (A4NT) to
defend against NLP-methods. Our defense is inspired by
the imitation model discussed in [15] and protects against
various attribute classifiers by learning to imitate the writing
style of a target class. For example, our model learns to
hide the gender of a female author by re-synthesizing the
text in the style of the male class. This imitation of writing
style is learnt by adversarially training [16] our style-transfer
network against the attribute classifier. Our A4NT network
learns the target style by learning to fool the authorship
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classifiers into mis-classifying the text it generates as target
class. This style transfer is accomplished while aiming to
retain the semantic content of the input text.
Unlike many prior works on authorship obfuscation [12,
13], we propose an end-to-end learnable author anonymiza-
tion solution, allowing us to apply our method not only
to authorship obfuscation but to the anonymization of any
author attribute ranging from the author’s identify over
gender to age with a unified approach. We illustrate this by
successfully applying our model on three different attribute
anonymization settings on two different datasets. Through
empirical evaluation, we show that the proposed approach is
able to fool the author attribute classifiers in all three settings
effectively and better than the baselines.
Technical challenges: We base our A4NT network architec-
ture on the sequence-to-sequence neural machine translation
model [17]. A key challenge in learning to perform style
transfer, compared to other sequence-to-sequence mapping
tasks like machine translation, is the lack of parallel training
data. Here, parallel/paired data refers to datasets with both
the input text and its corresponding ground-truth output text.
Some prior attempts to perform text style transfer required
paired training data [18] and hence were limited in their
applicability beyond toy-data settings. We overcome this by
training our A4NT network within a generative adversarial
networks (GAN) [16] framework. Using the GAN framework
we train the A4NT network to generate samples that match
the target distribution without need for paired data.
We characterize the performance of our A4NT network
along two axes: privacy effectiveness and semantic similarity.
Using automatic metrics and human evaluation to measure
semantic similarity of the generated text to the input, we show
that the proposed method offers a better trade-off between
privacy effectiveness and semantic similarity. We also analyze
the effectiveness of A4NT for protecting anonymity for
varying degrees of input text “difficulty”.
In summary, the main contributions of our paper are. (1):
We propose a novel approach to authorship obfuscation, that
uses a style-transfer network (A4NT) to transform the input
text to a target style and fool the attribute classifiers. The
network is trained without parallel data using adversarial
training. (2): The proposed obfuscation solution is end-to-end
trainable, and hence can be applied to protect different author
attributes and on different datasets with little to no changes to
the overall framework. (3): Quantifying the performance of
our system on privacy effectiveness and semantic similarity
to input, we show that it offers a better trade-off between
the two metrics compared to baselines.
2. Related Work
In this section we will review prior work relating to four
different aspects of our work – author attribute detection (our
adversaries), authorship obfuscation (competing prior work),
machine translation (basis of our A4NT network) and gener-
ative adversarial networks (training framework we use).
Authorship and attribute detection Authorship attribution
or stylometry is the task of identifying an author using the
stylistic properties of the text. A machine learning approach
where a set of text features are input to a classifier which
learns to predict the author have been used in most recent
author attribution models [6]. These methods have been
shown to work well on large datasets [11], duplicate author
detection [19] and even on non-textual data like code [20].
Sytlometric techniques can also be applied to determining
various attributes of the author like age or gender [9].
Classical author attribution methods rely on a predefined
set of features extracted from the input text [21]. Recently
deep-learning methods have been applied to learn to extract
the features directly from data [7, 22]. [22] uses a multi-
headed character-level recurrent neural network (RNN) to
train a generative language model on each author’s text and
use the model’s perplexity on the test document to predict the
author. Alternatively, [7] uses a character-level convolutional
network to train an author classifier. Similar to these deep
learning based approaches, we use a RNN based architecture
to train our authorship classifiers.
Authorship obfuscation Authorship obfuscation methods
are adversarial in nature to stylometric methods of author
attribution; they try to change the style of input text such
that author identity is not discernible. The majority of prior
works on author attribution are semi-automatic [12, 23],
where the system suggests authors to make changes to
the document by analyzing the stylometric features. The
few automatic obfuscation methods have relied on general
rephrasing methods like machine translation [14] or on
a predefined set of modifications to text [24]. Round-trip
machine translation, where input text is translated to multiple
languages one after the other until it is translated back to
the source language, is proposed as an automatic method of
obfuscation in [14]. Recent work [24] achieves obfuscation by
moving the stylometric features of the text towards average
values on the dataset applying pre-defined transformations
on input text.
In contrast, our novel method achieves automatic ob-
fuscation using text style transfer. This style transfer is not
pre-defined but learnt directly from data optimized for fooling
attribute classifiers. This allows us to apply our model on
various datasets, without additional engineering effort.
Machine translation The task of style-transfer of text data
shares significant similarities with the machine translation
problem. Both involve mapping an input text sequence onto
an output text sequence. Style transfer can be thought of
as machine translation on the same language. Therefore,
we base our A4NT network architecture on popular current
machine translation systems.
Large end-to-end trainable neural networks have become
a popular choice in machine translation [25, 26]. These meth-
ods are generally based on sequence-to-sequence recurrent
models [17] consisting of two networks, an encoder which
encodes the input sentence into a fixed size vector and a
decoder which maps this encoding to a sentence in the target
language. We base our A4NT network architecture on the
word-level sequence-to-sequence model [17] as opposed to
character-level models [27, 28], as the character-level models
require much larger computational resources due to increased
sequence length. Neural machine translation systems are
generally trained with large amounts of parallel training data.
However, in our setting, we do not have parallel training data
of the same text in different writing styles. We overcome
the lack of parallel training data by casting the problem as
matching style distributions instead of matching individual
sentences. Specifically, we want our A4NT network to take
an input text from a source distribution to generate text
whose style matches the target attribute distribution. This
is learnt without parallel data using distribution matching
methods.
Generative adversarial networks Generative Adversarial
Networks (GAN) [16] are a framework for learning a gener-
ative model to produce samples from a target distribution.
It consists of two models, a generator and a discriminator.
The discriminator network learns to distinguish between the
generated samples and real data samples. Simultaneously, the
generator learns to fool this discriminator network thereby
getting closer to the target distribution. In this two-player
game, the generator reaches optimality when it mimics the
target distribution perfectly [16].
GANs have been successfully applied to many image
generation tasks including unconditional generation [29],
image inpainting [30], and style transfer [31]. [31] applies
the GAN framework to train two paired generators to transfer
style of an image between two domains without paired
data. The generators are trained by using discriminators to
push the generated image towards the target distribution.
In addition to the GAN loss, a “cycle loss” is used to
keep the generated sample semantically close to the input
image by penalizing the l1 distance between the input and a
reconstruction obtained by round-trip style transfer.
We use a similar framework to transfer styles between
the input and the target attributes. However, unlike [31],
we use the likelihood of correct reconstruction instead of
the l1 loss to impose the cycle constraint. This proposed
loss addresses the sensitivity of l1 to alignment of the text
sequences and makes the training robust.
GAN on text The GAN framework is not widely adopted
in text generation tasks since the discrete nature of the text
output does not allow for backpropagation directly. A few
recent works have applied GAN to text generation tasks [32]–
[35] by using approximations to overcome this discreetness
problem. Gumbel-softmax approximation, which is used
in [34], tends to have lower variance estimation of gradients
compared to the REINFORCE trick [36] based solutions
used in [32, 33, 35] and consequently better convergence
properties as empirically shown in [37]. Thus, we use gumbel-
softmax approximation in our generator and utilize the GAN
framework to train our A4NT networks.
A recent approach to text style-transfer proposed in [38]
also utilizes GANs to perform style transfer using unpaired
data. However, the solution proposed in [38] changes the
meaning of the input text significantly during style transfer
and is applied on sentiment transfer task. In contrast, au-
thorship obfuscation requires the generated text to preserve
Figure 1: GAN framework to train our A4NT network. Input
sentence is transformed by the A4NT network to match the
style of the target attribute. This output is evaluated using the
attribute classifier and semantic consistency loss. A4NT is
trained by backpropagating through these losses.
the semantics of the input. We address this by proposing
and evaluating two methods to encourage the network to
preserve the meaning of the input text.
3. Author Attribute Anonymization
Private attributes of an anonymous author like identity,
gender and age, can be de-anonymized by first extracting
features from text using NLP-methods and then predict
private attributes with some attribute classifier. We propose
an author adversarial attribute anonymizing neural transla-
tion (A4NT) network to defend against adversaries attacking
these private attributes using NLP-methods. The proposed
solution includes the A4NT Network and the adversarial
training scheme combined with semantic and language losses
to learn to protect private attributes. The A4NT network
transforms the input text sequence from a source attribute
class to mimic the style of a different attribute class, and
thus fools the author attribute classifiers.
Technically, our A4NT network is essentially solving a
sequence to sequence mapping problem, similar to machine
translation. Both tasks can be phrased as transforming an
input text from the source domain (sequence of words) into
a corresponding text sequence in a target domain. Hence,
we design our A4NT network based on the sequence-to-
sequence neural language models [17], widely used in neural
machine translation [25]. These models have proven effective
when trained with large amounts of parallel data and are also
deployed commercially [26]. If there were parallel aligned
data in source and target attributes, we could train our
A4NT network exactly like a machine translation model,
with standard supervised learning. However, such parallel
corpora are infeasible to obtain as it would require the same
text written in multiple different styles.
To overcome the lack of parallel data, we view the
anonymization task as learning a generative model, Zxy(sx),
which transforms an input text sample sx drawn from source
attribute distribution sx ∼ X , to look like samples from the
target distribution sy ∼ Y . We can use generative modeling
techniques to train the A4NT network Zxy(sx) to generate
samples close to the target distribution Y , using just unpaired
samples from X and Y .
Figure 2: Block diagram of the attribute classifier network.
The LSTM encoder embeds the input sentence into a vector.
Sentence encoding is passed to linear projection followed
by softmax layer to obtain class probabilities
We use the Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
framework to train our model (see Figure 1). The GAN
framework consists of two models, a generator network
which generates synthetic samples trying to mimic the target
data distribution, and a discriminator network which tries
to distinguish real data samples from the synthesized “fake”
samples from the generator. The two models are trained
adversarially, i.e. the generator tries to fool the discriminator
and the discriminator tries to correctly identify the generator
samples. We use an attribute classifier network as the
discriminator and the A4NT network as the generator. The
A4NT network, in trying to fool the attribute classification
network, learns to transform the input text to mimic the style
of the target attribute and protect the attribute anonymity.
For our A4NT network to be a practically useful defen-
sive measure, the text output by this network should be able to
fool the attribute classifier while also preserving the meaning
of the input sentence. If we could measure the semantic
difference between the generated text and the input text it
could be used to penalize deviations from the input sentence
semantics. Computing this semantic distance perfectly would
need true understanding of the meaning of input sentence,
which is beyond the capabilities of current natural language
processing techniques. To address this aspect of style transfer,
we experiment with various proxies to measure and penalize
changes to input semantics, which will be discussed in
Section 3.4. In the following subsections we will describe
each of these modules in detail.
3.1. Author Attribute Classifiers
We build our attribute classifiers using neural networks
that predict the attribute label by directly operating on the
text data. This is similar to recent approaches in authorship
recognition [7, 22] where, instead of hand-crafted features
used in classical stylometry, neural networks are used to
directly predict author identity from raw text data. However,
unlike in these two prior works, our focus is attribute
classification and obfuscation. We train our classifiers with
recurrent networks operating at word-level, as opposed to
character-level models used in [7, 22] for two reasons. We
found that the word-level models give good performance
on all three attribute-classification tasks we experiment with
(see Section 5.1). Additionally, they are also significantly
faster than character-level models, making it feasible to use
these classifiers in GAN training described in Section 3.2.
Specifically, our attribute classifier network Ax to detect
attribute value x is shown in Figure 2. It consists of a
Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) [39] encoder network
to compute an embedding of the input sentence into a fixed
size vector. It learns to encode the parts of the sentence
most relevant to the classification task into the embedding
vector, which for attribute prediction is mainly the stylistic
properties of the text. This embedding is input to a linear
layer and a softmax layer to output the class probabilities.
Given an input sentence sx = {w0, w1, · · · , wn−1}, the
words are one-hot encoded and then embedded into fixed size
vectors using the word-embedding layer shown in Figure 2
to obtain vectors {v0, v1, · · · , vn−1}. This word embedding
layer encodes similarities between words into the word
vectors and can help deal with large vocabulary sizes. The
word vectors are randomly initialized and then learned from
the data during training of the model. This approach works
better than using pre-trained word vectors like word2vec [40]
or Glove [41] since the learned word-vectors can encode
similarities most relevant to the attribute classification task
at hand.
This sequence of word vectors is then passed through an
LSTM network recursively to obtain a sequence of outputs
{h0, h1, · · · , hn−1}. We refer the reader to [39] for the exact
computations performed to compute the LSTM output.
Now sentence embedding is obtained by concatenation
of the final LSTM output and the mean of the LSTM outputs
from other time-steps.
E(sx) =
[
hn−1;
1
n− 1
∑
hn−1
]
(1)
At the last time-step the LSTM network has seen all the
words in the sentence and can encode a summary of the
sentence in its output. However, using LSTM outputs from all
time-steps, instead of just the final one, speeds up training
due to improved flow of gradients through the network.
This is motivated by the success of such skip-connections
in various applications of deep neural networks [42]–[44].
Finally, E(sx) is passed through linear and softmax layers
to obtain class probabilities, for each class ci. The network
is then trained using cross-entropy loss.
pauth(ci|sx) = softmax(W · E(sx)) (2)
Loss(Ax) =
∑
i
ti(sx) log (pauth(ci|sx)) (3)
where t(sx) is the one-hot encoding of the true class of sx.
We experimented with more complex architectures – with
more LSTM layers or a multi-layer perceptron instead of
a linear layer – with little to no improvement over this
simple model. The same network architecture can be used
for different attribute classification tasks, including identity,
age and gender as in this paper.
3.2. The A4NT Network
One of the main goals while designing the A4NT network
is that it is trainable purely from data to obfuscate the
Figure 3: Block diagram of the A4NT network. First LSTM
encoder embeds the input sentence into a vector. The decoder
maps this sentence encoding to the output sequence. Gumbel
sampler is used to obtain “soft” samples from the softmax
distribution to allow backpropagation.
author attributes by learning to imitate the target style.
This is a significant departure from prior works on author
obfuscation [12, 24] that rely on hand-crafted rules for text
modification to achieve obfuscation. The methods relying
on hand-crafted rules are limited in applicability to specific
datasets they were designed for.
To achieve this goal, we base our A4NT network Zxy,
shown in Figure 3, on a recurrent sequence-to-sequence
neural translation model [17]. This class of models is
popular in many sequence-to-sequence learning tasks such as
machine translation [25], speech recognition [45], and part-
of-speech (POS) tagging [46]. As seen from the wide-range
of applications mapping text-to-text, speech-to-text, text-to-
POS , the sequence-to-sequence neural network models can
effectively learn to map input sequences to arbitrary output
sequences, with appropriate training. They operate on raw
text data and alleviate the need for hand-crafted features
or rules to transform the style of input text, predominantly
used in prior works on author obfuscation [12, 24]. Instead,
appropriate text transformations can be learnt directly from
data. Additionally, since no hand-crated rules are needed,
it allows us to easily apply the same A4NT network and
training scheme to different datasets and settings.
The A4NT network Zxy consists of two components, an
encoder and a decoder modules, similar to standard sequence-
to-sequence models. The encoder embeds the variable length
input sentence into a fixed size vector space. The decoder
maps the vectors in this sentence embedding space to output
text sequences in the target style. The encoder is an LSTM
network, sharing the architecture of the sentence encoder
in Section 3.1. The same architecture is used since the task
here is also to embed the input sentence sx into a fixed
size vector EG(sx). However, in contrast to the attribute
classifier, here the sentence embedding vector should learn
to represent the semantics of the input sentence allowing the
decoder network to generate a sentence with similar meaning
but in a different style.
The sentence embedding from the encoder is the input
to the decoder LSTM which generates the output sentence
one word at a time. At each step t, the decoder LSTM takes
EG(sx) and the previous output word wot−1 to produce a
probability distribution over the vocabulary for the next word.
Sampling from this distribution outputs the next word.
hdect (sx) = LSTM [EG(sx),Wemb(w˜t−1)] (4)
p(w˜t|sx) = softmaxV (Wdec · hdect (sx)) (5)
w˜t = sample(p(w˜t|sx)) (6)
where Wemb is the word embedding, Wdec matrix maps the
LSTM output to vocabulary size and V is the vocabulary.
In most applications of these sequence-to-sequence mod-
els, the networks are trained using parallel training data,
consisting of input and ground-truth output sentence pairs.
A sentence is input to the encoder and propagated through
the network and the network is trained to maximize the
likelihood of generating the paired ground-truth output
sentence. However, in our setting, we do not have access to
such parallel training data of text in different styles and the
A4NT network Zxy is trained in an unsupervised setting.
To address the lack of parallel training data, we use the
GAN framework to train the A4NT network. In the GAN
framework, the A4NT network Zxy learns by generating
text samples and improving itself iteratively to produce text
that the attribute classifier, Ay, classifies as target attribute.
Using the GAN framework also gives the benefit of directly
optimizing our A4NT network to fool the attribute classifiers.
It can hence learn to make transformations to the parts of
the text which are most revealing of the attribute at hand,
and so hide the attribute with minimal changes.
However, to use the GAN framework, we need to be able
to differentiate through the samples generated by Zxy. The
A4NT network produces stochastic output that is composed
of a sequence of discrete tokens, and thus is not differentiable
in a straight forward way.
Differentiability of discrete samples: To obtain an output
sentence sample s˜y from the A4NT network Zxy, we can
sample from the distribution p(w˜t|sx), shown in (5), repeat-
edly until a special ‘END’ token is sampled. This naive
sampling though is not suitable for training Z within a
GAN framework as sampling from multinomial distribution,
p(w˜t|sx), is not differentiable.
To make sampling differentiable we follow the approach
used in [34] and use the Gumbel-Softmax approximation [37]
to obtain differentiable soft samples from p(w˜t|sx). The
gumbel-softmax approximation includes two parts. First, the
re-parametrization trick using the gumbel random variable is
applied to make the process of sampling from a multinomial
distribution differentiable w.r.t the probabilities p(w˜t|sx).
Next, softmax is used to approximate the arg-max operator
to obtain “soft” samples instead of one-hot vectors. This
makes the samples themselves differentiable. Thus, the
gumbel-softmax approximation allows differentiating through
sentence samples from the A4NT network enabling end-
to-end GAN training. Further details on gumbel-softmax
approximation can be found in [37, 47].
Splitting decoder: To transfer styles between attribute pairs,
x and y, in both directions, we found it ineffective to use
Figure 4: Illustrating use of GAN framework and cyclic
semantic loss to train a pair of A4NT networks.
the same network Zxy. A single network Zxy is unable to
sufficiently switch its output word distributions solely on
a binary condition of target attribute. Nonetheless, using
a separate network for each ordered pair of attributes is
prohibitively expensive. A good compromise we found is
to use the same encoder to embed the input sentence but
different decoders for style transfer between each ordered
pair of attributes. That is, A4NT network Zxy from x to y
is composed as Zxy = [EG;Dxy] and the network Zyx from
y to x is composed as Zyx = [EG;Dyx]. Encoder EG is
shared between Zxy and Zyx. Sharing the encoder allows
the two networks to share a significant number of parameters
and enables the attribute specific decoders to deal with words
found only in the vocabulary of the other attribute group
using shared sentence and word embeddings.
3.3. Style Loss with GAN
To train our A4NT network to imitate the style of the
target attribute class we use the Generative Adversarial
Network framework [16]. Using the GAN framework allows
us to train our two A4NT networks Zxy and Zyx to produce
samples which are indistinguishable from samples from
distributions of attributes y and x respectively, without having
paired sentences from x and y.
Figure 4 illustrates the GAN training mechanism we
use to train the two A4NT networks. Given a sentence
sx written by author with attribute x, the A4NT network
outputs a sentence s˜y = Zxy(sx). This is passed to the
attribute classifier for attribute y, Ay, to obtain probability
pauth(y|s˜y). Zxy tries to fool the classifier Ay into assigning
high probability to its sentence output, whereas Ay tries to
assign low probability to sentences produced by Zxy while
assigning high probability to real sentences sy written by
y. The same process is followed to train the A4NT network
from y to x, with x and y swapped.
The loss functions used to train the A4NT network and
the attribute classifiers in this setting is given by:
L(Ay) = − log (pauth(y|sy))− log (1− pauth(y|s˜y)) (7)
Lstyle(Zxy) = − log (pauth(y|s˜y)) (8)
Figure 5: Semantic consistency in A4NT networks is en-
forced by maximizing cyclic reconstruction probability.
The two networks Zxy and Ay are adversarially com-
peting with each other when minimizing the above loss
functions. At optimality it is guaranteed that the distribution
of samples produced by Zxy is identical to the distribution of
y [16]. However, we want the A4NT network to only imitate
the style of y, while keeping the content from x. Thus, we
explore different means to enforce the semantic consistency
between the the input sentence and the A4NT output.
3.4. Preserving Semantics
We want the output sentence, s˜y, produced by Zxy(sx)
not only to fool the attribute classifier, but also to preserve
the meaning of the input sentence sx. We use a semantic
loss Lsem(s˜y, sx) to quantify the meaning lost or changed
during the anonymization by A4NT . Simple approaches
like matching words in s˜y and sx can severely limit the
effectiveness of anonymization, as it will even penalize
synonyms or alternate phrasing. In the following subsection
we will discuss two different approaches to define Lsem, and
later in Section 5 we compare these approaches quantitatively.
3.4.1. Cycle Constraints. One could evaluate how seman-
tically close is s˜y to sx by evaluating how easy it is to
reconstruct sx from s˜y. If s˜y means exactly the same as
sx, there should be no information loss and we should
be able to perfectly reconstruct sx from s˜y. We could
use the A4NT network in the reverse direction to obtain
a reconstruction, s¨x = Zyx(s˜y) and compare it to input
sentence sx. Such an approach, referred to as cycle constraint,
has been used in image style transfer [31]. Here they use l1
distance to compare the reconstructed image and the original
image to impose semantic relatedness penalty on style
transfer. However, in our case l1 distance is not meaningful
to compare s¨x and sx, as they are sequences of possibly
different lengths. Even a single word insertion or deletion
in s¨x can cause the entire sequence to mismatch and be
penalized by the l1 distance.
A simpler and more stable alternative we use in this work,
is to forgo the reconstruction and just compute the likelihood
of reconstruction of sx when applying reverse style-transfer
on s˜y. This likelihood is simple to obtain from the reverse
A4NT network Zyx using the word distribution probabilities
at the output. This cyclic loss computation is illustrated in
Figure 5. Accordingly, we compute reconstruction probability
Pr(sx|s˜y) and define the semantic loss as:
Pr(sx|s˜y) =
n−1∏
t=0
pzyx(wt|s˜y) (9)
Lsem(s˜y, sx) = − logPr(sx|s˜y) (10)
The lower the semantic loss Lsem, the higher the reconstruc-
tion probability and thus more meaning of the input sentence
sx is preserved in the style-transfer output s˜y.
3.4.2. Semantic Embedding Loss. Another approach to
measuring the semantic loss is to embed the two sentences,
s˜y and sx, into a semantic space and compare two embedding
vectors using standard distances in this vector space. The
idea is that a semantic embedding method embeds similar
meaning sentences close to each other in this vector space.
This approach is used in many natural language processing
tasks, for example in semantic entailment [48]
Since we do not have annotations of semantic relatedness
on our datasets, it is not possible to train a semantic embed-
ding model but instead we have to rely on pre-trained models
known to have good transfer learning performance. Several
such semantic sentence embeddings are available in the
literature [48, 49]. We use the universal sentence embedding
model from [48], pre-trained on the Stanford natural language
inference dataset [50]. This model was shown to perform
well on several transfer learning tasks on different datasets,
including sentiment classification, paraphrase detection and
semantic relatedness [48].
We embed the two sentences using this semantic embed-
ding model F and use the l1 distance to compare the two
embeddings and define the semantic loss as:
Lsem(s˜y, sx) =
∑
dim
|F (sx)− F (s˜y)| (11)
3.5. Smoothness with Language Model Loss
The A4NT network can minimize the style and the
semantic losses, while still producing text which is broken
and grammatically incorrect. To minimize the style loss
the A4NT network needs to add words typical of the target
attribute style, while minimizing the semantic loss, it needs
to retain the semantically relevant words from the input
text. However neither of these two losses explicitly enforces
correct grammar and word order of s˜.
On the other hand, unconditional neural language models
are good at producing grammatically correct text. The
likelihood of the sentence produced by our A4NT model
s˜ under an unconditional language model, My, trained on
the text by target attribute authors y, is a good indicator of the
grammatical correctness of s˜. The higher the likelihood, the
more likely the generated text s˜ has syntactic properties seen
in the real data. Therefore, we add an additional language
smoothness loss on s˜ in order to enforce Z to produce
syntactically correct text.
Llang(s˜) = − logMy(s˜) (12)
Overall loss function: The A4NT network is trained with a
weighted combination of the three losses: style loss, semantic
consistency loss and language smoothing loss.
Ltot(Zxy) = wstyLstyle + wsemLsem + wlLlang (13)
We chose the above three weights so that the magnitude
of the weighted loss terms are approximately equal at the
beginning of training. Model training was not sensitive to
exact values of the weights chosen that way.
Implementation details: We implement our model using
the Pytorch framework [51]. The networks are trained by
optimizing the loss functions described with stochastic
gradient descent using the RMSprop algorithm [52]. The
A4NT network is pre-trained as an autoencoder, i.e to
reconstruct the input sentence, before being trained with
the loss function described in (13). During GAN training,
the A4NT network and the attribute classifiers are trained
for one minibatch each alternatively. We will open source
our code, models and data at the time of publication.
4. Experimental Setup
We test our A4NT network on obfuscation of three
different binary attributes of authors on two different datasets.
The three attributes we experiment with include author’s age
(under 20 vs over 20), gender (male vs female authors), and
author identities (setting with two authors). The restriction to
binary attributes brings certain advantages and challenges. It
simplifies the experimental setting and allows faster iteration
with fewer models to train. On the flip-side it simplifies the
task of attribute classifiers with only two classes, making
them harder to fool.
4.1. Datasets
We run our experiments on two different real world
datasets: Blog Authorship corpus [53] and Political Speech
dataset. The datasets are from very different sources with
distinct language styles, the first being from mini blogs
written by several anonymous authors, and the second from
political speeches of two US presidents Barack Obama and
Donald Trump. This allows us to show that our approach
can work across very different language corpora.
Blog dataset: The blog dataset is a large collection of micro
blogs from blogger.com collected by [53]. The dataset con-
sists of 19,320 “documents” along with annotation of author’s
age, gender, occupation and star-sign. Each document is
a collection of all posts by a single author. In our work
we utilize this dataset in two different settings; split by
gender (referred to as blog-gender setting) and split by age
annotation (blog-age setting). In the blog-age setting, we
group the age annotations into two groups, teenagers (age
between 13-18) and adults (age between 23-45) to obtain
data with binary age labels. Note that the age-groups 19-
22 are missing in the original dataset. Since this dataset
consists of free form text written while blogging, sentence
boundaries are not well marked with the period symbol. We
Dataset Attributes # Documents # Sentences # Vocabulary
Speech Identity 372 65k 5.6k
Blog Age, Gender 19320 3.38 Mil 22k
TABLE I: Comparing statistics of the two datasets.
use the Stanford CoreNLP tool to segment the documents
into sentences. All numbers are replaced with the NUM
token.
Political speech dataset: To test the limits of how far style
imitation based anonymization can help protect author’s
identity, we also test our model on two well known political
figures with very different verbal styles. We collected the
transcripts of political speeches (transcribed from the actual
speech) of Barack Obama and Donald Trump made available
by the The American Presidency Project1. While the two
authors talk about similar topics they have highly distinctive
verbal styles and vocabularies in their speeches, making it
a challenging dataset for our A4NT network. The dataset
consists of 372 speeches, with about 65,000 sentences in
total as shown in Table I. We treat each speech as a
separate document when evaluating the classification results
on document-level. This dataset contains a significant amount
of references to named entities like people, organizations, etc.
To avoid that both attribute classifiers and the style transfer
model rely on these references to specific people, we use
the Stanford Named Entity Recognizer tool [54] to identify
and replace these entities with entity labels.
The comparison of the two datasets can be found in
Table I. The blog dataset is much larger in size and therefore
we run most of our evaluation on it. Using these two datasets,
we evaluate our model in three different attribute obfuscation
settings, namely age obfuscation (blog-age), gender obfusca-
tion (blog-gender) and identity obfuscation (speech dataset).
Detailed analysis of our model presented in Section 5.2
is done on the validation split of the blog dataset, in the
blog-age setting, containing 2,799 documents and 518,268
sentences.
4.2. Evaluation Methods
We evaluate our models w.r.t. two different aspects:
(a) Privacy effectiveness, to measure how well the
A4NT network can fool the attribute classifiers and (b)
Semantic similarity, quantifying how much of the input
sentence semantics is preserved after style transfer.
To quantify privacy effectiveness we compare the F1-
score of the attribute classifiers on the original data and the
generated text. We use classifiers trained independently on
real data and not the ones used in GAN training. The classifier
used in GAN training are not used, to avoid evaluating the
A4NT network against the specific classifier it has learnt to
fool. In a real-world setting, we will not have access to the
parameters of the attribute-classifier used by the adversary
1. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
to train our A4NT network and it should be able to do well
against adversaries it has not trained on.
The F1-score for the attribute classifiers is computed as:
F1 = 2 ∗ precision ∗ recall
precision + recall
(14)
If the style transfer is successful, the attribute classifier will
mis-classify generated text and the F1-scores should drop.
We consider the obfuscation to be successful if the F1-score
drops below the F1-score of a random guessing classifier.
Note that since the datasets are not perfectly balanced w.r.t
the binary attributes, the F1-score for random classifier is not
0.5. The expected document-level F1-scores corresponding
to random guessing are 0.54 for the blog-age setting, 0.5 for
the blog-gender setting, and 0.61 for the speech data.
To quantify semantic similarity, we use the Meteor [55]
metric. It is used in machine translation and image captioning
to evaluate the similarity of the candidate text using a
reference text. Meteor compares the candidate text to one
or more references by matching n-grams, allowing for soft
matches using synonym and paraphrase tables. We compute
the Meteor score between the generated and input text and
use this as the measure of semantic similarity.
However, the automatic evaluation for semantic similarity
is not perfectly correlated with human judgments, especially
with few reference sentences.To address this, we additionally
conduct a human evaluation study on a subset of the test
data of 745 sentences. We ask human annotators on Amazon
Mechanical Turk to judge the semantic similarity of the
generated text from our models.
4.3. Baselines
We use the two baseline methods below to compare our
model with. Both chosen baselines are automatic obfuscation
methods that do not rely on hand-crafted rules.
Autoencoder We can train our A4NT network Z as an
autoencoder, where it takes as input sx and tries to reproduce
it from the encoding. The autoencoder is trained similar to
a standard neural language model with cross entropy loss.
We train two such auto-encoders Zxx and Zyy for the two
attributes. Now simple style transfer can be achieved from
x to y by feeding the sentence sx to the autoencoder of the
other attribute class Zyy . Since Zyy is trained to output text
in the y domain, the sentence Zyy(sx) tends to look similar
to sentences in y. This model sets the baseline for style
transfer that can be achieved without cross domain training
using GANs, with the same network architecture and the
same number of parameters.
Google machine translation: A simple and accessible
approach change writing style of a piece of text without
hand designed rules is to use machine translation software.
The idea is to pass the text through machine translation from
a source language through multiple intermediate languages
until finally translating back to the source language. The
hope is that through this round-trip the style of the text has
changed, whereas the meaning is preserved. This was used
Setting Training Set Validation Set
Sentence Document Sentence Document
Speechdata 0.84 1.00 0.68 1.00
Blog-age 0.76 0.92 0.74 0.88
Blog-gender 0.64 0.93 0.52 0.75
TABLE II: F1-scores of the attribute classification networks
in different settings. All attribute classifiers perform well
and better than the document-level random chance baselines
(0.62 for speech), (0.53 for age), and (0.50 for gender)
in the PAN authorship obfuscation challenge recently [14]
as a solution to mask author identities automatically.
Following this idea we use the Google machine transla-
tion service2 to perform round-trip translation on our input
sentences. We have tried a varying number of intermediate
languages, results of which will be discussed in Section 5
Since Google limits api-calls and imposes character limits on
manual translation, we use this baseline only on the subset
of 745 sentences from the test set for human evaluation.
5. Experimental Results
We test our model on the three settings discussed in
section 4 with the goal to understand if the proposed
A4NT network is able to sufficiently fool the attribute
classifiers to protect the anonymity of the author attributes.
Through quantitative evaluation done in Section 5.1, we show
that this is indeed the case: our A4NT network learns to fool
the attribute classifiers across all three settings. We compare
the two semantic loss functions presented in Section 3.4 and
show that the proposed reconstruction likelihood loss does
better than pre-trained semantic encoding.
However, this privacy gain comes with a trade-off. The se-
mantics of the input text is sometimes altered. In Section 5.2,
using qualitative examples, we analyze the failure modes of
our system and identify limits up to which style-transfer can
help preserve anonymity.
We use three variants of our model in the following
study. The first model uses the semantic encoding loss
described in Section 3.4.2 and is referred to as FBsem. The
second uses the reconstruction likelihood loss discussed in
Section 3.4.1 instead, and is denoted by CycML. Finally,
CycML+Lang uses both cyclic maximum likelihood and the
language smoothing loss described in Section 3.5.
5.1. Quantitative Evaluation
Before discussing the performance of our A4NT network,
we evaluate the attribute classifiers on the three settings
we use. For this, we train the attribute classifier model in
Section 3.1 on all three settings. Table II shows the F1-
scores of the trained attribute classifiers on the training and
the validation splits of the blog and the speech datasets.
2. https://translate.google.com/
Document-level scores are obtained from accumulating the
class log-probability scores on each sentence in a document
before picking the maximum scoring class as the predicted
label. We also tried hard voting to accumulate sentence level
decisions, and observed that the results with hard voting
follow the same trend across datasets and splits (including
results with A4NT network in the following subsection).
We see that on the smaller political speech dataset, the
attribute classifier is able to easily discriminate between the
two author identities, Barack Obama and Donald Trump,
achieving perfect F1-score of 1.0 on both the training and
the validation splits. The model also performs well on the
age-group classification, achieving F1-score of 0.88 on the
validation set at the document-level. Gender classification
turns out to be the hardest to generalize, with a signifi-
cant drop in F1-score on the validation set compared to
the training set (down to 0.75 from 0.93). In all three
tasks, the performance on sentence-level is worse than on
document-level classification. Document-level classification
also generalizes better with less difference between training
and validation set F1-scores in Table II. Henceforth, we will
use document-level classifier F1-score as our primary metric
when evaluating the effectiveness of A4NT networks.
5.1.1. Quantifying Privacy Gains from A4NT . We can
now evaluate the performance of our A4NT network using
the attribute classifiers presented in the previous section. To
obfuscate the authorship of a document, the A4NT network
is run on every sentence in a document to transfer style from
the true attribute to the target one. For example, to mask age
of a teenager written document we use the A4NT network
ZTeen−Adult. This style-transferred document is input to the
attribute classifier of the source attribute and F1-score of
this classifier is computed. This measures the effectiveness
of the style transfer in terms of privacy. Additionally, meteor
score is computed between the source sentence and the
A4NT output, to measure the semantic similarity preserved.
Table III shows the result of this evaluation on three set-
tings. On the small speech dataset all methods, including the
autoencoder baseline described in Section 4.3, successfully
fool the attribute classifier. They all obtain F1-scores below
the chance-level, with our A4NT networks doing slightly
better. However the meteor scores of all models is signifi-
cantly lower than in the blog dataset, indicating significant
amount of semantics in the process of anonymization.
On the larger blog dataset, the autoencoder baseline fails
to fool the attribute classifier, with only a small drop in
F1-score of 0.03 (from 0.88 to 0.85) in case of age and 0.14
in case of gender (from 0.75 to 0.61) Our A4NT models
however do much better, with all of them being able to drop
the F1-score below the random chance level.
The FBsem model using semantic encoder loss achieves
the largest privacy gain, by decreasing the F1-scores from
0.88 to 0.08 in case of age and from 0.75 to 0.39 in case of
gender. This model however suffers from poor meteor scores,
indicating the sentences produced after the style transfer are
no longer similar to the input sentence.
Model Blog-age data Blog-gender data Speech dataset
Sent F1 Doc F1 Meteor Sent F1 Doc F1 Meteor Sent F1 Doc F1 Meteor
Random classifier 0.54 0.54 - 0.53 0.5 - 0.60 0.61 -
Original text 0.74 0.88 1.0 0.68 0.75 1.0 0.68 1.00 1.0
Autoencoder 0.69 0.85 0.77 0.49 0.61 0.78 0.26 0.12 0.32
A4NT FBsem 0.43 0.08 0.40 0.45 0.39 0.53 0.12 0.00 0.28
A4NT CycML 0.49 0.20 0.57 0.41 0.44 0.79 0.11 0.00 0.29
A4NT CycML+Lang 0.54 0.32 0.69 0.44 0.39 0.79 0.12 0.00 0.29
TABLE III: Performance of the style transfer anonymization in fooling the classifiers, across the three settings. F1 (lower is
better) and Meteor (higher is better). F1-scores below chance levels are shown in italics.
The model using reconstruction likelihood to enforce
semantic consistency, CycML, fares much better in meteor
metric in both age and gender style transfer. It is still able to
fool the classifier, albeit with smaller drops in F1-scores (still
below random chance). Finally, with addition of the language
smoothing loss (CycML+Lang), we see a further improve-
ment in meteor in the blog-age setting, while the performance
remains similar to CycML on blog-gender setting and the
speech dataset. However, the language smoothing model
CycML+Lang fares better in human evaluation discussed in
Section 5.1.2 and also produces better qualitative samples
as will be seen in Section 5.2.
Generalization to other classifiers: A question that
arises from the experiments in table Table III is if the
A4NT networks are only able to fool the classifier archi-
tectures it was trained with in the GAN setup or can they
generalize to unseen classifier architectures. This is important
if the system is to be applied to protect the privacy of author
attributes against unseen adversaries.
To test this we train a second attribute classifier network
on the blog-age setting. This network consists of a convo-
lutional layer on top of the LSTM network described in
Section 3.1. Results from evaluating the text generated by
the A4NT networks using this “holdout” classifier are shown
in Table IV. First we note that the holdout classifier has
similar performance to the LSTM classifier on the original
text, achieving 0.87 document-level F1-score. We can see
from this table that all three A4NT networks generalize
well and are able to drop the document-level F1-score of
the holdout classifier below the random chance level. They
perform slightly worse than on the LSTM classifier they
have seen, but are still well below the random chance
level. This confirms that the transformations applied by the
A4NT networks are not specific to the classifier they are
trained with, but can also generalize to other adversaries.
We conclude that the proposed A4NT networks are able
to fool the attribute classifiers on all three tested tasks and
also show generalization ability to fool classifier architectures
not seen during training.
Different operating points : Our A4NT model offers the
ability to obtain multiple different style-transfer outputs
by simply sampling from the models distribution. This is
useful as different text samples might have different levels
Model LSTM Classifier Holdout Classifier
Sent F1 Doc F1 Sent F1 Doc F1
Original text 0.74 0.88 0.65 0.87
Autoencoder 0.69 0.85 0.71 0.84
A4NT FBsem 0.43 0.08 0.45 0.11
A4NT CycML 0.49 0.20 0.52 0.26
A4NT CycML+Lang 0.54 0.32 0.56 0.43
TABLE IV: Performance of style transfer anonymization in
fooling the classifiers, on blogdata (age)
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Figure 6: Operating points of three A4NT models on testset
of semantic similarity and privacy effectiveness. Having
multiple samples allows users to choose the level of semantic
similarity vs privacy trade-off they prefer.
We illustrate this in Figure 6. Here five samples are
obtained from each A4NT model for each sentence in the
test set. By choosing the sentence with minimum, maximum
or random meteor scores, we can obtain a trade-off between
semantic similarity and privacy. We see that while the FBsem
model offers limited variability, CycML+LangLoss offers a
wide range of choices of operating points. The best sam-
ples (in meteor) from the FBsem model are still significantly
worse than the worst samples from CycML+LangLoss.
5.1.2. Human Judgments for Semantic Consistency. In
machine translation and image captioning literature, it is
well known that automatic semantic similarity evaluation
metrics like meteor are only reliable to a certain extent.
Evaluation from human judges is still the gold-standard with
which models can be reliably compared.
Accordingly, we conduct human evaluations to judge
the semantic similarity preserved by our A4NT networks.
The evaluations were conducted on a subset of 745 random
sentences from the test split of the blog dataset in the blog-
age setting. First, output from different A4NT models is
obtained for the 745 test sentences. If any model generates
identical sentences to the input, this model is ranked first
automatically without human evaluation. Note that, in some
cases, multiple models can achieve rank-1, when they all
produce identical outputs. The cases without any identical
sentences to the input are evaluated using human annotators
on Amazon Mechanical Turk. An annotator is shown one
input sentence and multiple style-transfer outputs and is asked
to pick the output sentence which is closest in meaning to
the input sentence. Three unique annotators are shown each
test sample and majority voting is used to determine the
model which ranks first. Cases where there is no majority
from human evaluators are excluded.
The main goal of the study is to identify which of the
three A4NT networks performs best in terms of semantic
similarity according to human judges. We also compare the
best of our three systems to the baseline model based on
Google machine translation, discussed in Section 4.3.
For the machine translation baseline, we obtain style-
transferred texts from four different language round-trips.
We started with English→German→ French→English, and
obtained three more versions with incrementally adding
Spanish, Finnish and finally Armenian languages into the
chain before the translation back to English.
To pick the operating points for the human evaluation
study, we compare the performance of these four machine
translation baselines and our three models on the human-
evaluation test set in Figure 7. Note that here we show
sentence-level F1 score on the y-axis as the human-evaluation
test set is too small for document-level evaluation. We see
that none of the Google machine translation baselines are
able to fool the attribute classifiers. The model with 5-hop
translation achieves best (lowest) F1-score of 0.81 which is
only slightly less than the input data F1-score of 0.9. This
model also achieves significantly worse meteor score than
any of our A4NT models.
We conduct human evaluation for our style-transfer
models on two different operating points of 0.5 F1-score and
0.66 F1-scores, to obtain human judgments at two different
levels of privacy effectiveness. The results are shown in
Table V. We see that the model CycML+Lang outperforms
the other two models at both operating points. CycML+Lang
wins 50.74% of the time (ignoring ties) at operating point
0.5 and 57.87% of the time at operating point 0.66. These
results combined with quantitative evaluation discussed in
Section 5.1 confirm that the cyclic ML loss combined with
the language model loss gives the best trade-off between
semantic similarity and privacy effectiveness.
Finally, we conduct human evaluation between the Cy-
cML+Lang model operating at 0.79 and the Google machine
translation baseline with 3 hops. The operating point was
chosen so that the two models were closest to each other in
privacy effectiveness and meteor score. Results are shown
in Table VI. We can see that our model wins over the
GoogleMT baseline by approximately 16% (59.46% vs
43.76% rank1). This is largely because our A4NT model
learns not to change the input text if it is already ambiguous
for the attribute classifier, and only makes changes when
necessary. In contrast, changes made by GoogleMT round
trip are not optimized towards maximizing privacy gain, and
can change the input text even when no change is needed.
5.2. Qualitative Analysis
In this section we will look at some qualitative examples
of anonymized text produced by our A4NT model and try to
identify strengths and weaknesses of this approach. Then we
analyze the performance of the A4NT network on different
levels of input difficulty. We use the attribute classifiers’ score
as a proxy measure of the input text difficulty. If the text
is confidently correctly classified (with classification score
of 1.0) by the attribute classifier, then the A4NT network
has to make significant changes to fool the classifier. If it
is already misclassified, the style-transfer network should
ideally not make any changes.
5.2.1. Examples of Style Transfer for anonymization. Ta-
ble VII shows the results of our A4NT model CycML+Lang
applied to some example sentences in the blog-age setting.
Style transfer in both directions, teenager to adult and adult
to teenager, is shown along with the corresponding source
attribute classifier scores. The examples illustrate some of
the common changes made by the model and are grouped
into three categories for analysis (# column in Table VII).
# 1. Using synonyms: The A4NT network often uses syn-
onyms to change the style to target attribute. This is seen
in style transfers in both directions, teen to adult and adult
to teen in category # 1 samples in Table VII. We can see
the model replacing “yeh” with “ooh”, “would” with “will”,
“...” with “,” and so on when going from teen to adult, and
replacing “funnily enough” with “haha besides”, “work out”
with “go out” and so on when changing from adult to teen.
We can also see that the changes are not static, but depend
on the context. For example “yeh” is replaced with “alas” in
one instance and with “ooh” in another. These changes do
not alter the meaning of the sentence too much, but are able
to fool the attribute classifiers thereby providing privacy to
the author attribute against NLP adversaries.
# 2. Replacing slang words: When changing from teen to
adult, A4NT often replaces the slang words or incorrectly
spelled words with standard English words, as seen in cate-
gory #2 in Table VII. For example, replacing “wad” (what)
with “definitely”, “wadeva” with “perhaps” and “nuthing”
with “ofcourse”. The opposite effect is seen when going
from adult to teenager style, with changes like addition of
“diz” (this) and replacing of “think” with “relized” (realized).
These changes are learned entirely from the data, and would
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Figure 7: Privacy effectiveness and seman-
tic consistency of our A4NT networks and
the Google Machine Translation baseline
on the human eval test set
Operating Point FBsem CycML CycML + Lang
0.66 32.02 39.75 57.87
0.5 15.03 31.68 50.74
TABLE V: Human evaluation to judge semantic similarity of generated
sentences to input. Three variants of our model are compared. The numbers
show the % times the model was ranked first. Can add to more than 100% as
multiple models can have rank-1 when they keep the input sentence identical
Comparison A4NT CycML + Lang GoogleMT
Operating point 0.79 0.85
% Rank 1 59.46 43.76
TABLE VI: Human evaluation comparing our best model to the
Google Machine Translation baseline.
# Input: Teen A(x) Output: Adult A(x)
1 and yeh... it’s raining lots now 0.97 and ooh... it’s raining lots now 0.23
1 yeahh... i never let anyone really know how i’m feeling. 0.94 anyhow, i never let anyone really know how i’m feeling . 0.24
1 yeh, it’s just goin ok here too! 0.95 alas, it’s just goin ok here too! 0.30
1 would i go so far to say that i love her? 0.52 will i go so far to say that i love her? 0.36
2 wad a nice day... spend almost the whole afternoon doing work! 0.99 definitely a nice day... spend almost the whole afternoon doing work! 0.19
2 wadeva told u secrets wad did u do ? 0.98 perhaps told u secrets why did u do ? 0.49
2 i don’t know y i even went into dis relationship 0.92 i don’t know why i even went into another relationship . 0.33
2 i have nuthing else to say about this horrid day. 0.79 i have ofcourse else to say about this accountable day. 0.08
3 after school i got my hair cut so it looks nice again. 1.0 after all i have my hair cut so it looks nice again. 0.42
3 i had an interesting day at skool. 0.97 i had an interesting day at wedding. 0.05
# Input: Adult A(x) Output: Teen A(x)
1 funnily enough , i do n’t care all that much. 0.58 haha besides , i do n’t care all that much. 0.05
1 i may go to san francisco state, or i may go back. 0.54 i shall go to san francisco state, or i may go back. 0.09
1 i wonder if they ’ll work out... hard to say. 0.52 i wonder if they ’ll go out... hard to say. 0.39
2 one is to mix my exercise order a bit more. 0.97 one is to mix my diz exercise order a bit more. 0.08
2 ok, think i really will go to bed now. 0.79 ok, relized i really will go to bed now. 0.08
3 my first day going out to see clients after vacation. 0.98 my first day going out to see some1 after vacation. 0.04
3 i’d tell my wife how much i love her every time i saw her. 0.96 i’d tell my crush how much i love her every time i saw her. 0.06
3 i do believe all you need is love. 0.58 i dont think all you need is love . 0.11
TABLE VII: Qualitative examples of anonymization through style transfer in the blog-age setting. Style transfer in both
direction is shown along with the attribute classifier score of the source attribute.
be very hard to encode explicitly in a rule based system due
to great variety in slangs and spelling mistakes.
# 3. Semantic changes: One failure mode of A4NT is when
the input sentence has semantic content which is significantly
more biased to the author’s class. These examples are shown
in category #3 in Table VII. For example, when an adult
author mentions his “wife”, the A4NT network replaces it
with “crush”, altering the meaning of the input sentence.
Some common entity pairs where this behavior is seen
are with (school↔work), (class↔office), (dad↔husband),
(mum↔wife), and so on. Arguably, in such cases, there is no
obvious solution to mask the identity of the author without
altering these obviously biased content words.
On the smaller speech dataset however, the changes made
by the A4NT model alter the semantics of the sentences in
many cases. Some example style transfers from Obama to
Trump’s style are shown in Table VIII. We see that the model
inserts hyperbole (“better than anybody”, “horrible horrible”,
“crooked”), references to “media” and “system”, all salient
characteristics of Trump’s style. We see that the style-transfer
here is quite successful, sufficient to completely fool the
identity classifier as was seen in Table III. However, and
somewhat expectedly, the semantics of the input sentence is
generally lost. A possible cause is that the attribute classifier
is too strong on this data, owing to the small dataset size
and the highly distinctive styles of the two authors, and to
Input: Obama Output: Trump
we can do this because we are
MISC.
we will do that because we are MISC.
we can do better than that. we will do that better than anybody.
it’s not about reverend PERSON. it’s not about crooked PERSON.
but i’m going to need your help. but i’m going to fight for your country.
so that’s my vision. so that’s my opinion.
their situation is getting worse. their media is getting worse.
i’m kind of the term PERSON
because i do care.
i’m tired of the system of PERSON
PERSON because they don’t care.
that’s what we need to change. that’s what she wanted to change.
that’s how our democracy works. that’s how our horrible horrible
trade deals.
TABLE VIII: Qualitative examples of style transfer on the
speech dataset from Barack Obama to Donald Trump’s style
fool them the A4NT network learns to make drastic changes
to the input text.
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Figure 8: Output Privacy vs
Privacy on Input.
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Figure 10: Histogram of privacy gain (left side) is shown
alongside comparison of meteor score vs privacy gains.
5.2.2. Performance Across Input Difficulty. Figure 8
compares the attribute classifier score on the input sen-
tence and the A4NT output. Ideally we would want all
theA4NT outputs to score below the decision boundary, while
also not increasing the classifier score compared to input
text. This “ideal score” is shown as grey solid line. We see
that for the most part all three A4NT models are below
or close to this ideal line. As the input text gets more
difficult (increasing attribute classifier score), the CycML
and CycML+Lang slightly cross above the ideal line, but
still provide significant improvement over the input text (drop
in classifier score of about ∼ 0.45).
Now, we analyze how much of input semantics is
preserved with increasing difficulty. Figure 9 plots the meteor
score of the A4NT output against the difficulty of input text.
We see that the meteor is high and stable for sentences already
across the decision boundary. These are easy cases, where
the A4NT networks do not need to intervene. As the input
text gets more difficult, the meteor score of the A4NT output
drops, as the network needs to do more changes to be able
to fool the attribute classifier. The CycML+Lang model fares
better than the other two models, with consistently higher
meteor score across the difficulty spectrum.
Figure 10 shows the histogram of privacy gain across the
test set. Privacy gain is the difference between the attribute
classifier score on the input and the A4NT network output.
We see that majority of sentences transformations by the
A4NT networks leads to positive privacy gains, with only
a small fraction leading to negative privacy gains. This is
promising given that this histogram is over all the 500k
sentences in the test set. Meteor score plotted against privacy
gain shown in Figure 10, again confirms that large privacy
gains comes with a trade-off of higher loss in semantics.
6. Conclusions
We have presented a novel automatic method for pro-
tecting privacy sensitive attributes of an author against NLP
based attackers. Our solution consists of the A4NT network
which learns to fool attribute classifiers by transforming the
input text to imitate style of a target attribute. The network
learns to perform these privacy targeted transformations
automatically, by adversarially training against the attribute
classifiers. The A4NT network is trained end-to-end on non-
parallel data and thus can be applied easily to new datasets.
Experiments on three different attributes namely age,
gender and identity, showed that the proposed A4NT network
is able to effectively fool the attribute classifiers in all the
three settings. Moreover, we show that the A4NT network
also performs well against unseen classifier architectures.
This implies that the method is likely to be effective against
previously unknown NLP adversaries.
We proposed a novel method to preserve the semantic
similarity of input text using likelihood of reconstruction.
Semantic similarity (quantified by meteor score) of the
A4NT network remains high for easier sentences, which
don’t reveal the attributes with obvious give-away words
(school, work, husband etc.), but is lower on difficult sen-
tences implying the network effectively learns to identify and
apply the right magnitude of change. The A4NT network can
be operated at different points on the privacy-effectiveness
and semantic-similarity trade-off curve, and thus offers
flexibility to the user. The experiments on the political speech
dataset show the limits to which style transfer based approach
can be used to hide attributes. On this challenging dataset
with very distinct styles by the two authors, our method
effectively fools the identity classifier but achieves this by
altering the semantics of the input text.
Although, we tested our model on binary attributes, it
can be extended to m-ary valued attributes. One simple
method would be to pick a fixed target class (based on
difficulty) for each input class and train m separate style-
transfer networks. Instead, methods to condition the style-
transfer network effectively on input-target class pairs could
be investigated, allowing the use of a single network to
transfer styles between arbitrary attribute pairs.
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